Legal position last verified: 13 October 2026
Türkiye has now set out how social-network age verification and child accounts are expected to work in practice. The Regulation published on 10 October 2026 does not simply impose a general “social media ban”. Its legal structure is more precise: social network providers must not provide services to children who have not reached the age of 15, while users aged 15–17 must be offered a child-specific differentiated service.
The rules take effect on 1 November 2026. Accounts opened before that date and not yet verified through the e-Government Gateway age-verification token must be addressed by 31 March 2027. Providers will need more than a new identity-check screen: onboarding, child-account design, recommender systems, advertising, parental tools, appeals and data governance all form part of the same compliance project.1
In brief: the user’s age status will be checked through an e-Government Gateway token when an account is opened. Service may not be provided to a child under 15. Users aged 15–17 may retain access, but their accounts must follow separate rules on privacy, messaging, discovery, advertising, livestreaming and engagement-oriented design.
Timeline and scope
| Date | Legal stage | Operational consequence |
|---|---|---|
| 10 October 2026 | Regulation published | Finalise product, contract, data-flow and governance changes against the definitive text |
| 1 November 2026 | Entry into force | Apply age verification to new accounts and differentiated-service rules to users aged 15–17 |
| 31 March 2027 | Deadline for existing accounts | Verify accounts opened earlier that have not been checked through the token |
The Regulation applies to domestic and overseas social network providers whose services are accessible from Türkiye. Incorporation outside Türkiye is therefore not a complete answer to scope. The service offered to Turkish users, and the statutory definition of a social network provider under Law No. 5651, need to be assessed.
The underlying rule was introduced by Law No. 7578 through amendments to Additional Article 4 of Law No. 5651. Subsequent institutional amendments aligned the competent-authority terminology with the Cyber Security Presidency. The Regulation now turns that framework into operational rules for age checks, child accounts and appeals.2
Two age groups, two legal outcomes
The text does not treat every minor in the same way. A social network provider must not provide its service to a child who has not reached the age of 15. If an existing account is placed in that category, the child must be informed and the account closed after any appeal has been resolved. The timing of deletion also depends on whether the appeal right is used.
A user who has reached 15 but is still under 18 is not excluded altogether. Instead, the provider must offer a child-specific differentiated service — the Turkish text uses the term ayrıştırılmış hizmet. This is broader than adding a parental-control panel to an adult account. It requires the child’s version of the product to behave differently across privacy defaults, discovery, messaging, recommendations and advertising.
How the age-verification token will work
At account creation, every user’s age status must be checked through an age-verification token created via the e-Government Gateway. The person authenticates within the government service. The resulting token indicates only whether the 15 and 18 thresholds have been crossed; it does not contain the person’s name or social-network username. The provider verifies that the Cyber Security Presidency created the token and assigns the account to the relevant age category. The token may not be repurposed.
The duty continues after onboarding. Providers must operate their own single or layered age checks during the life of the service. If there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an account is being used in the wrong age category, the account may be temporarily suspended and a fresh token check requested. Those methods must be transparent, testable and auditable, avoid discriminatory outcomes, and remain accessible to users with disabilities.
A separate passport-based token is contemplated for people who are not resident in Türkiye but are temporarily present. Further detail on the token’s technical structure, security and use is expected in implementation guidance from the Cyber Security Presidency.
What changes in a child account?
Article 8 of the Regulation reaches directly into product design for users aged 15–17. Among other things:
- the account must be private by default and may not be made public;
- follower and following lists may not be visible to other users;
- only accounts followed by the child may send messages, and read receipts may not be displayed;
- address books and contact lists from devices or other platforms may not be matched for social discovery;
- the child’s account may not be recommended to others, and other accounts may not be recommended to the child;
- livestreaming may not be made available;
- reasonable technical measures must be taken against screenshots of the profile and posts;
- interfaces that present visual material successively through scrolling, tapping, clicking or automated operation may not be used;
- services or design patterns capable of producing addictive effects may not be included;
- the service may not be personalised by reference to the child’s behaviour, and personal data may not be used for profiling-based advertising or personalised commercial advertising;
- content-filtering and recommender-system settings must take account of the child’s age and development.
Compliance cannot therefore sit with the legal or identity team alone. Product, trust and safety, advertising technology, data protection, accessibility and customer-support teams will need a common control map.
Providers must also publish on their own websites the measures taken for the child-specific differentiated service. That disclosure should do more than repeat a marketing assurance: it should explain, in accessible terms, the defaults and restrictions applied to the child’s account.
Some provisions will require careful technical interpretation. Preventing a device screenshot, for example, cannot stop someone from photographing the screen with a second device. The better reading is not that a provider must guarantee the impossible, but that it must select, test and document reasonable technical measures that serve the rule’s protective purpose.
The limits of parental tools
Parental tools may cover account settings, approval of paid transactions, monitoring and limiting time spent, and location-sharing functions. They must not, however, become a system of continuous surveillance that removes the child’s privacy disproportionately.
The Regulation frames parental involvement around communication, learning and the development of the child’s digital skills. Automatic disclosure of every message or every online action is not the only permissible model. Product decisions should balance safety with the child’s evolving autonomy.
Data-protection issues
A lawful and necessary age check does not authorise unlimited collection. Under the general principles of Türkiye’s Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (the KVKK), providers should be able to explain at least the following:
- Data minimisation: if a threshold token is sufficient, why would a copy of an identity document, full date of birth or facial biometric be needed?
- Purpose limitation: the result should not be reused for advertising segmentation, unrelated profiling or additional commercial purposes.
- Retention: evidence that a check occurred should be separated from the token itself; retention periods and re-verification triggers should be defined.
- Provider chain: the roles and international-transfer consequences of cloud, fraud-prevention, analytics and age-check vendors should be assessed separately.
- Child-friendly notice: information should be presented in concise, understandable layers rather than only in a long adult-facing privacy policy.
For comparison, Article 28 of the EU Digital Services Act requires online platforms accessible to minors to put in place appropriate and proportionate measures ensuring a high level of privacy, safety and security. It also restricts profiling-based advertising where the provider is aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient is a minor. The EDPB’s 2025 statement on age assurance emphasises data minimisation, proportionality, transparency and non-discrimination. The Turkish age threshold and e-Government token do not come from the DSA or GDPR, however; they arise from Turkish law and the new Regulation.3
Related material is available on our Data Protection, Technology and Digital Regulation page and in our analysis of Türkiye’s KVKK guide for lawyers and law firms.
Appealing an incorrect age decision
Providers must offer a Turkish-language, free and accessible route to challenge an age-verification result, suspension or closure, or a safeguard applied to a child account. The challenge may not be decided only by an automated system: it must receive meaningful human review.
Account content and personal data must not be deleted while the application is pending. The outcome must also explain the possibility of complaining to the Cyber Security Presidency and seeking judicial review. Annual publication of the number of appeals, the acceptance rate and average resolution time should make it possible to test not only the formal existence of the remedy but also the error rate of the underlying model.
Enforcement and a compliance plan
The Regulation refers non-compliance to the enforcement regime in Additional Article 4 of Law No. 5651. Under the current Additional Article 4(24), an administrative fine of up to three per cent of the provider’s global turnover for the preceding calendar year may be imposed for the specified breaches. Continued non-compliance may lead through a staged process to an advertising ban and, subject to a court order, bandwidth throttling. These measures are not automatic in every case. The Regulation requires notice of the breach and a reasonable cure period having regard to its nature; seriousness, duration, the number of affected children and good-faith compliance efforts are relevant to the response.
A practical pre-1 November workstream should cover at least:
- scope and entity mapping for the Türkiye-facing service;
- age-check scenarios for new, existing, suspicious and temporary-visitor accounts;
- a feature and default-settings matrix for users aged 15–17;
- an inventory of token, verification-evidence, log and vendor data flows;
- child-friendly terms, privacy information and help content;
- a free, accessible Turkish appeal route with human review;
- an auditable record of testing, product decisions and annual statistics.
Existing-account verification through 31 March 2027 should be run as a separate migration project. Failed checks, suspension, appeal and deletion need a defined order. If that sequence is left to be designed during the migration, both rights disputes and operational pressure are likely to increase.
Frequently asked questions
Are the rules already in force?
The Regulation was published on 10 October 2026 and takes effect on 1 November 2026. The deadline for existing accounts not verified through the token is 31 March 2027.
May a child who has reached 15 use the service?
Yes, but the differentiated-service rules apply until the user reaches 18.
Will the platform collect everyone’s identity card?
The Regulation does not require that. The e-Government Gateway token indicates only whether the relevant age thresholds have been crossed. Any additional provider check remains subject to necessity, proportionality and the KVKK.
May a child account livestream?
No. Livestreaming may not be offered within the child-specific service for users aged 15–17.
What happens if the age decision is wrong?
The provider must make available a Turkish-language, free and accessible challenge mechanism. The application must receive meaningful human review, and the result must explain the available administrative complaint and judicial routes.
Conclusion
The real effect of the Regulation is not a single age gate. It requires providers to revisit the relationship between the product and a child user: account defaults, recommendation and advertising systems, support, evidence, retention and remedies all change.
A sound implementation should avoid two opposite errors — a superficial check that does not enforce the statutory threshold, and an intrusive system that gathers more identity or behavioural data than protection requires. The legal and technical test is whether the threshold can be applied reliably while preserving privacy, accessibility and an effective right to challenge an incorrect decision.
Official sources and notes
- Regulation on the Provision of Child-Specific Differentiated Services and Age Verification by Social Network Providers, Official Gazette No. 33396, 10 October 2026. Official Gazette PDF (Turkish); accessible full text on the official Ministry of National Education page. ↩
- Law No. 7578 amending Additional Article 4 of Law No. 5651. Official text adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. ↩
- EU Digital Services Act, Article 28, EUR-Lex; EDPB, Statement 1/2025 on Age Assurance. ↩
Information note: This article provides general legal information. It is not legal advice or a compliance opinion for a particular provider. Each product, data flow and service model requires a separate assessment.
