
Legal position last verified: 3 August 2026.
A promise that data will remain “on EU servers” is not, by itself, a complete analysis of personal data transfers between Türkiye and the EU. A Turkish team may enter customer records into an Irish SaaS platform; a German parent may allow its Istanbul affiliate to access employee files; a US support team may remotely view accounts hosted in Frankfurt; or a third-party sign-in component may disclose an IP address during an otherwise ordinary website visit.
Each operation can produce a different transfer direction, set of parties and legal mechanism. In 2026, the decisive compliance task is therefore not to place a standard contract in a procurement file. It is to establish, with auditable evidence, who makes which personal data available to whom, in what capacity, from which jurisdiction and through what technical access path.
Transfers from Türkiye are governed by Article 9 of Law No 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (“KVKK”). Transfers from the European Economic Area (“EEA”) to Türkiye are governed by Chapter V of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). The two regimes share concepts, but they are not interchangeable: a Turkish standard contract does not replace the European Commission’s standard contractual clauses (“EU SCCs”), and EU SCCs do not satisfy the Turkish notification and form requirements.1
The practical point: A single one-way disclosure does not automatically require two sets of standard clauses. A bidirectional group, cloud, HR, CRM or AI environment may, however, contain several legally distinct transfers—Türkiye to the EU, the EEA to Türkiye and onward transfers to other countries—each requiring its own analysis.
The 2026 position at a glance
| Question | Position as at 3 August 2026 | Operational consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Has the Turkish Personal Data Protection Board designated any adequate country, sector or international organisation? | No. The Board has not yet published an adequacy determination.2 | A recurring export from Türkiye will commonly require an appropriate safeguard. |
| Has the European Commission adopted a GDPR Article 45 adequacy decision for Türkiye? | No. Türkiye is not on the Commission’s current adequacy list.3 | A recurring EEA-to-Türkiye transfer will usually require an Article 46 mechanism. |
| Is a Turkish standard contract complete once signed? | No. The correct module, valid signatures, authority evidence and notification to the Turkish authority within five business days after completion of signatures are required.4 | Contract execution, notification and evidence management must operate as one workflow. |
| Are EU SCCs sufficient merely because the parties signed them? | Not necessarily. Following Schrems II, the actual transfer and the law and practice of the destination must be assessed, with supplementary measures where required.5 | A transfer impact assessment (“TIA”) and technical architecture review are central. |
| Can consent routinely support a cloud or intra-group transfer? | No. The incidental cases under the KVKK and the derogations in GDPR Article 49 are exceptional and should not become the permanent basis for ordinary transfers.6 | A sustainable safeguard is needed for systematic operations. |
1. Diagnose the transfer before selecting the document
The first question should not be “Where is the server?” It should be: Which separate organisation makes personal data available to which other organisation, and where is that recipient located? The European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) treats a disclosure or making available by a GDPR-subject exporter to a separate controller or processor in a third country as a Chapter V transfer.7 Its supplementary-measures recommendations also identify remote access from a third country to data stored in the EEA as a transfer scenario.8
A reliable transfer inventory should therefore cover:
- remote access by non-Turkish or non-EEA group companies;
- access available to a foreign cloud provider’s support, security or incident-response teams;
- subprocessors and their countries of establishment and access;
- content delivery networks, analytics, error monitoring, call centres and identity providers;
- backups, disaster recovery, logs and telemetry;
- prompts, uploaded material and output logs used in generative AI services;
- onward transfers after data first reaches Türkiye or the EEA.
A supplier statement that a data centre is located in Frankfurt may be relevant, but it does not answer questions about support access, cryptographic key control, replication, subprocessors or onward disclosure. Those elements belong in the legal and technical assessment.
2. Transfers from Türkiye: the three-level structure of KVKK Article 9
Article 9 was replaced by Law No 7499 with effect from 1 June 2024. The reformed model is usefully understood as a three-level sequence: an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards and narrowly defined incidental cases.9
2.1 Adequacy
An adequacy decision may concern a country, one or more sectors within a country, or an international organisation. The Turkish authority’s current official page states that the Board had not made an adequacy determination as at 3 August 2026.10
The fact that a recipient is established in the EU does not therefore make that destination automatically “adequate” for KVKK purposes. The existence of the GDPR is relevant context, but it is not a substitute for the Turkish Board’s statutory decision.
2.2 Appropriate safeguards
In the absence of adequacy, recurring or ordinary-course transfers will generally need one of the safeguards recognised by Article 9. They are:11
- a non-treaty agreement between eligible public bodies, together with Board authorisation;
- binding corporate rules approved by the Board for transfers within a group of undertakings;
- a standard contract published by the Board; or
- a written undertaking providing adequate protection, together with Board authorisation.
A transfer mechanism does not create the underlying permission to process the data. The exporter must separately identify an applicable condition under KVKK Articles 5 or 6 and comply with purpose limitation, data minimisation, transparency, security and retention requirements.
2.3 Incidental cases
The statutory incidental cases are for transfers that are not regular, do not continue over time and do not form part of the ordinary course of activities. They include, subject to their conditions, explicit consent after information on possible risks, necessity for a contract, important public interest, legal claims and vital interests.12
Monthly payroll exports, a permanently deployed foreign SaaS platform or systematic access by a global support team should not be recharacterised as “incidental” merely because a consent form exists. Recent Turkish scholarship likewise emphasises that the exceptions should not become a general basis for continuous data flows.13
3. Turkish standard contracts: execution is part of substantive compliance
The Board’s Decision No 2024/959 of 4 June 2024 introduced four modules:14
- controller to controller;
- controller to processor;
- processor to processor; and
- processor to controller.
The correct module depends on the parties’ legal roles in the specific processing operation, not simply on the service label or invoice. A provider may act as processor when hosting customer data but as an independent controller for defined security, billing or product-governance activities. A role analysis that ignores this functional reality may produce a formally executed contract that does not describe the actual transfer.
Execution and notification checklist
Read together, the authority’s official notice on recurring deficiencies and the 2026 private-law analysis of the signature requirement point to the following controls:15
- Identify the exporter, importer and roles for the relevant processing.
- Select the correct module among the four official texts.
- Execute the Turkish text validly. Where a bilingual two-column version is used, signatures should be placed on the Turkish column as required by the authority’s notice.
- Retain evidence of authority for each signatory.
- Reconcile names and dates across the contract, authority documents and notification.
- Notify within five business days after all signatures have been completed.
- Use an accepted channel: physical filing, registered electronic mail (“KEP”) or the authority’s online notification module. The module was enabled under Decision No 2024/1793 of 17 October 2024.16
- Check foreign-document formalities, including apostille or legalisation and notarised Turkish translation where applicable.
- Preserve the official text. Do not alter it outside the permitted optional or alternative provisions.
- Avoid artificial retroactivity. The stated effective date should reflect the real execution position.
A 2026 article in the Istanbul Law Review argues that the signature requirement should be treated as a validity requirement rather than a matter of evidence alone. This reinforces the need to treat execution, representation and formalities as part of the safeguard itself—not as post-signing administration.17
Managing the five-business-day period
The deadline should be embedded into the contract lifecycle:
- record a single, verifiable “final signature date”;
- trigger tasks for legal, procurement and information-security teams;
- retain the filing receipt or system confirmation with the executed contract;
- reassess changes to parties, roles, modules, annexes or data flows;
- monitor termination, return/deletion and any resulting notification duties.
4. Transfers from the EEA to Türkiye: Chapter V, EU SCCs and a TIA
Türkiye is not on the European Commission’s current Article 45 adequacy list.18 A recurring disclosure from an EEA exporter to a separate controller or processor in Türkiye will therefore commonly rely on an Article 46 safeguard. The most frequently used mechanism is the EU SCCs adopted by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914.19
Following Schrems II, however, EU SCCs are not a “sign and file” instrument. The Court of Justice preserved their validity while requiring an assessment of whether the law and practice of the third country may prevent the clauses from delivering an essentially equivalent level of protection in the circumstances of the transfer.20 EDPB Recommendations 01/2020 set out a six-step roadmap: know the transfers, identify the transfer tool, assess the destination, adopt supplementary measures, complete formal steps and re-evaluate at appropriate intervals.21
What should a TIA record?
A defensible TIA should address at least:
- categories of data, data subjects, frequency, scale and purpose;
- controllers, processors, subprocessors and onward recipients;
- whether the data is transferred in clear, encrypted, pseudonymised or split form;
- who controls cryptographic keys and whether the importer must access intelligible data;
- applicable rules and practices concerning public-authority access;
- the importer’s procedural rights, ability to challenge requests and transparency options;
- whether data minimisation or a more localised architecture can meet the business purpose;
- whether contractual, organisational and technical measures together provide essentially equivalent protection;
- the events that will trigger reassessment.
The outcome should not be pre-determined. Where effective supplementary measures cannot be implemented, the exporter should not begin the transfer or should suspend it. That follows both the EDPB’s official position and post-Schrems II scholarship.22
5. The layer a contract cannot solve: system architecture
International transfer compliance is a joint legal and security-engineering problem. Statements such as “we use TLS” or “the data is encrypted” are incomplete unless the assessment also asks who holds the keys, when the data must be decrypted and who can access it.
Potential measures include:
- data minimisation, removing fields unnecessary for the purpose;
- pseudonymisation or tokenisation, with re-identification information held separately and under separate control;
- key control, where the use case permits keys to remain with the exporter or another trusted entity;
- role-based access, multi-factor authentication and privileged-access management;
- protected audit trails for foreign support and administrator activity;
- regional processing and restrictions on unnecessary global replication;
- onward-transfer controls for new subprocessors, country changes and corporate transactions;
- verifiable retention and deletion across backups, logs, test systems and temporary files;
- assessment of privacy-enhancing technologies, including split processing, secure multiparty computation or federated learning where suitable.
Academic work on technology and third-country transfers finds that privacy-enhancing technologies can materially reduce exposure, while warning that not all encryption architectures—particularly arrangements in which the provider controls the keys—deliver the same protection.23 The appropriate measure is therefore the product of a threat model, not a generic checklist response.
6. How one project can engage both transfer regimes
Scenario A — A Turkish business uses an EU-hosted SaaS service
A Turkish controller uploads customer data to a provider in Ireland. Because the Turkish Board has not issued an adequacy decision, the Turkish exporter needs a KVKK Article 9 route; the Turkish standard contract may be available if the roles and conditions fit. Receipt of the data in the EU is not, by itself, an EU-to-third-country transfer under Chapter V, although the recipient’s own GDPR obligations continue.
Scenario B — A German parent sends workforce data to its Istanbul operation
The EEA-to-Türkiye disclosure engages GDPR Chapter V. In the absence of EU adequacy for Türkiye, the exporter will ordinarily need EU SCCs or another Article 46 mechanism, together with a Schrems II-compliant assessment. The Turkish recipient’s processing may separately be subject to the KVKK.
Scenario C — A bidirectional group platform with US support
Istanbul and Berlin teams access the same HR platform, while a US support team can view records for troubleshooting. The Türkiye-to-EU, EU-to-Türkiye and possible EU/Türkiye-to-US movements must be separated in the inventory. Turkish standard contracts, EU SCCs and subprocessor controls may apply to different legs. No single document supplies the legal basis for every direction.
7. A current EU judicial signal: websites can create transfer exposure
Schrems II remains the leading authority for assessing third-country law and the effectiveness of safeguards beyond the wording of the contract.24 The more recent judgment in Bindl v Commission illustrates how ordinary web architecture may also matter. The General Court awarded EUR 400 in non-material damages after an IP address was transferred to Meta in the United States when the claimant used a Facebook account to sign in through EU Login.25
Two qualifications are essential. First, Bindl concerns Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, which governs EU institutions, rather than the GDPR directly. It should not be presented as a private-sector GDPR judgment. Secondly, the relevant findings are under appeal in Case C‑206/25 P.26 Subject to those limits, the case is a clear reason to include identity providers, content delivery networks and third-party website services in the transfer inventory.
8. A 12-step implementation checklist
- Define the business process: purpose, owner and required output.
- Map the actual data path: APIs, remote access, support, backups, logs and subprocessors.
- Identify entities and countries: legal entity, establishment, actual access locations and onward recipients.
- Classify roles: controller, joint controller, processor or subprocessor.
- Confirm the domestic processing condition: KVKK Articles 5/6 and, where relevant, GDPR Articles 6/9.
- Separate transfer directions: Turkish exports, EEA exports and onward transfers should appear on distinct lines.
- Choose the mechanism: adequacy, standard clauses, BCRs, undertaking/authorisation or a genuinely exceptional derogation.
- Select the module: use the correct Turkish and/or EU SCC module for the roles and flow.
- Assess the recipient and destination: undertake a TIA for EU SCC transfers and a proportionate recipient/country assessment for other flows.
- Implement supplementary measures: minimisation, pseudonymisation, key control, access, logging, retention and onward-transfer controls.
- Complete form and filing steps: authority evidence, translation/legalisation, dates, five-business-day Turkish notification and record retention.
- Monitor change: subprocessors, countries, service architecture, public-authority-access practices, legislation and adequacy decisions.
9. Common failure points
- assuming every EU Member State is automatically adequate under the KVKK;
- treating EU SCCs as a substitute for the Turkish standard contract;
- signing a Turkish standard contract but missing the five-business-day notification;
- choosing the module by product name rather than actual legal role;
- excluding remote foreign support access from the transfer inventory;
- reviewing only the primary data-centre address and ignoring subprocessors;
- using consent or contractual-necessity derogations as a permanent basis for routine transfers;
- reducing a TIA to a generic country memorandum;
- stating that data is “encrypted” without examining the design and key control;
- separating the transfer document from privacy notices, retention, Article 28/data-processing terms and security controls.
Frequently asked questions
Are EU Member States automatically adequate under Turkish data protection law?
No. Adequacy under KVKK Article 9 depends on a decision of the Turkish Board. Its current official page states that no adequacy determination had been made as at 3 August 2026.
Do EU SCCs replace the Turkish standard contract?
No. EU SCCs are a GDPR Chapter V mechanism; the Board’s standard contracts are a safeguard under KVKK Article 9. Depending on the directions and roles in a wider data environment, either or both may be needed for different transfer legs.
When does the Turkish five-business-day notification period begin?
According to the authority’s official notice, it runs from completion of the signatures. The final signature date, authority evidence and filing confirmation should be retained together.
Can remote access from abroad constitute a transfer?
Yes. Keeping data physically on an EEA or Turkish server does not automatically exclude a transfer where a separate organisation in another country can access the data. The entities, roles, locations and access path must be assessed.
Does signing EU SCCs remove the need for a TIA?
No. Schrems II requires consideration of the transfer context and the law and practice of the destination. Supplementary technical, contractual or organisational measures may be required; if effective protection cannot be achieved, the transfer should not proceed.
Can consent support a permanently deployed cloud service?
Consent is not a universal solution to transfer compliance. The incidental cases under the KVKK and GDPR Article 49 derogations are exceptional. A recurring, systematic transfer in the ordinary course of business requires a sustainable transfer mechanism.
Conclusion: transfer compliance begins with the map, not the signature page
The weakest point in a Türkiye–EU transfer programme is often not the complete absence of contractual wording. It is an incomplete data-flow inventory, an incorrect role classification, invisible technical access or the assumption that one set of clauses covers every legal direction.
The disciplined sequence is to identify the actual flow and direction; confirm the domestic processing condition; select the transfer mechanism and module; complete signature and notification formalities; implement technical measures; and reassess when law, suppliers or architecture change.
That process does more than reduce regulatory exposure. It simplifies data architecture, shortens supplier negotiations, provides stronger assurances to international clients and creates an auditable record of accountability.
Legal information notice
This article provides general information only. It is not a legal opinion, data protection impact assessment or transfer impact assessment for any specific operation. The legal characterisation of a transfer depends on the data, roles, jurisdictions, technical access model, contracts and law applicable at the time of review.
Bibliography
Primary and official materials
- Law No 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, art 9, as amended by Law No 7499.
- Kişisel Verilerin Yurt Dışına Aktarılmasına İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik (Official Gazette 10 July 2024/32598).
- Turkish Personal Data Protection Board, Decision No 2024/959 (4 June 2024).
- Turkish Personal Data Protection Board, Decision No 2024/1793 (17 October 2024).
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), arts 44–49.
- Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914.
- EDPB, Recommendations 01/2020, Version 2.0.
- EDPB, Guidelines 05/2021, Version 2.0.
- Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (C‑311/18) EU:C:2020:559.
- Bindl v European Commission (T‑354/22) EU:T:2025:4; appeal C‑206/25 P.
Academic literature
- Juliussen BA, Kozyri E, Johansen D and Rui JP, ‘The Third Country Problem under the GDPR: Enhancing Protection of Data Transfers with Technology’ (2023) 13(3) International Data Privacy Law 225.
- Kuner C, ‘Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems’ (2017) 18(4) German Law Journal 881.
- Murphy MH, ‘Assessing the Implications of Schrems II for EU–US Data Flow’ (2022) 71(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 245.
- Ulu AB, ‘Kişisel Verilerin Yurt Dışına Aktarımı’ (2026) 84(1) İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası 1.
- Yücedağ N and Akkanat Öztürk EB, ‘Kişisel Verilerin Yurtdışına Aktarımına İlişkin Standart Sözleşmelerde İmza Şartı: Borçlar Hukuku Açısından Bir Değerlendirme’ (2026) 83(4) İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası 1461.
Footnotes
Law No 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, art 9, as amended by Law No 7499 art 34 (Official Gazette 12 March 2024/32487) https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.6698.pdf; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1, arts 44–49 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority, ‘Transfer Abroad’ https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/2053/Yurtdisina-Aktarim accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
European Commission, ‘Adequacy Decisions’ https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority, ‘Public Announcement on Matters to Be Considered in Standard Contracts Used for Transfers of Personal Data Abroad’ (5 February 2025) https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/8170/Yurt-Disina-Kisisel-Veri-Aktariminda-Kullanilacak-Standart-Sozlesmelerde-Dikkat-Edilmesi-Gereken-Hususlara-Iliskin-Kamuoyu-Duyurusu accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (C‑311/18) EU:C:2020:559, paras 126–147 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311; European Data Protection Board, ‘Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures that Supplement Transfer Tools to Ensure Compliance with the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data’ (Version 2.0, 18 June 2021) https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/edpb_recommendations_202001vo.2.0_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
KVKK art 9(6); GDPR art 49; Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority (n 2); EDPB (n 5) paras 25–26.↩︎
European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 05/2021 on the Interplay between the Application of Article 3 and the Provisions on International Transfers as per Chapter V of the GDPR’ (Version 2.0, 14 February 2023) https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-052021-on-the-interplay-between-the-application-of-article-3-and-the_en accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
EDPB (n 5) para 13 and fn 22.↩︎
Law No 7499 Amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and Certain Laws, art 34 (Official Gazette 12 March 2024/32487) https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2024/03/20240312-1.htm; Ali Berat Ulu, ‘Kişisel Verilerin Yurt Dışına Aktarımı’ (2026) 84(1) İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası 1, 4–7 https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2026.84.1.0007.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority (n 2).↩︎
KVKK art 9(4); Kişisel Verilerin Yurt Dışına Aktarılmasına İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik [Regulation on the Procedures and Principles for the Transfer of Personal Data Abroad] (Official Gazette 10 July 2024/32598) https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2024/07/20240710-2.htm; Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority (n 2).↩︎
KVKK art 9(6); Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority (n 2).↩︎
Ulu (n 9) 20–23.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Board, Decision No 2024/959 (4 June 2024); Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority, ‘Public Announcement on Documents Relating to Standard Contracts and Binding Corporate Rules’ https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/7938/Standart-Sozlesmeler-ve-Baglayici-Sirket-Kurallarina-Iliskin-Dokumanlar-Hakkinda-Kamuoyu-Duyurusu accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority (n 4); Nafiye Yücedağ and Elif Beyza Akkanat Öztürk, ‘Kişisel Verilerin Yurtdışına Aktarımına İlişkin Standart Sözleşmelerde İmza Şartı: Borçlar Hukuku Açısından Bir Değerlendirme’ (2026) 83(4) İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası 1461 https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2025.83.4.006.↩︎
Turkish Personal Data Protection Board, Decision No 2024/1793 (17 October 2024); Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority, ‘Public Announcement on the Standard Contract Notification Module’ (25 October 2024) https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/8043/Standart-Sozlesme-Bildirim-Modulu-Hakkinda-Kamuoyu-Duyurusu accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎
Yücedağ and Akkanat Öztürk (n 15) 1474–1481.↩︎
European Commission (n 3).↩︎
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries [2021] OJ L199/31 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2021/914/oj.↩︎
Schrems II (n 5) paras 126–147.↩︎
EDPB (n 5) paras 8–49.↩︎
EDPB (n 5) paras 48–54; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘Assessing the Implications of Schrems II for EU–US Data Flow’ (2022) 71(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 245, 254–261 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000348; Christopher Kuner, ‘Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems’ (2017) 18(4) German Law Journal 881 https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200022197.↩︎
Bjørn Aslak Juliussen, Elisavet Kozyri, Dag Johansen and Jon Petter Rui, ‘The Third Country Problem under the GDPR: Enhancing Protection of Data Transfers with Technology’ (2023) 13(3) International Data Privacy Law 225, 232–241 https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipad013.↩︎
Schrems II (n 5).↩︎
Bindl v European Commission (T‑354/22) EU:T:2025:4, paras 177–197 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022TJ0354.↩︎
European Commission v Bindl (C‑206/25 P), appeal lodged 17 March 2025, OJ C/2025/2370 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2370/oj/eng accessed 3 August 2026.↩︎